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
## Research Report

THE AIR FORCE AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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The Air Force and Low Intensity Conflict

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

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## ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Air Force and Low Intensity Conflict

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Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a modern term for an old battlefield. It is vague, poorly understood and, in many instances confused with special operations. Many military personnel ignore or fail to comprehend the broad ideas encompassed by LIC, and the overriding political characteristic of this conflict. The involvement of the Air Force in LIC, or Special Air Warfare as it was known, has had many peaks and valleys. There were boom years during the Vietnam conflict, and almost complete inactivation in the years that followed. Tragically it took a failed rescue attempt in the Iranian desert to create renewed interest in this vital capability.

Today the Air Force is experiencing a resurgence in LIC training and operations. Still, it directs its efforts mainly at direct action operations to the detriment of indirect action operations. This uneven emphasis in training is due to a lack of education and poor understanding of the low intensity environment. The average Air Force member has a view of conflict that conforms with direct actions, clear objectives, firepower and a tendency to concentrate on the big war. He has a poor grasp of the complex and overtly political LIC environment which

encompasses joint, interagency and combined operations. To complicate matters, there is a lack of explicit LIC doctrine and strategy to guide how the Air force should organize, train and employ its forces in LIC.

LIC education begins with a clear understanding of the four LIC operational categories described in AFP 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, specifically the insurgency phenomenon. The U.S. Air Force has a key role to play in LIC through Foreign Internal Defense (FID) programs in support of host nation Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategies.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Enrique A. Oti II is a member of the Air War College class of 1992. He served as the squadron commander of the 9th Special Operations Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla., and deployed with the unit to operations JUST CAUSE, and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As an HC-130 (Combat Shadow) pilot, Lt Col Oti's involvement with Combat Rescue and Special Operations began in 1979. Lt Col Oti participated in the joining of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) and the Special Operations Forces (SOF). He experienced the recent growth of special operations and the organization of 23d Air Force, and later the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Lt Col Oti holds a bachelors degree in aerospace engineering degree from the University of Missouri at Rolla, and a masters degree in aviation management degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

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## INTRODUCTION

"Peace is not breaking out all over. Numerous phenomena foment instability around the world, including rising nationalism, burgeoning international arms bazaars, increasing ethnic tensions, religious fundamentalism, environmental degradation and disease, economic stagnation coupled with rising expectations, and overpopulation and urbanization."

James R. Locher III  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Special Operations, and  
Low-Intensity Conflict

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war have led many to believe that peace is breaking out all over. With a typically isolationist view, many Americans say; "we can now relax and enjoy the peace dividend." "It is time to divert all that excess military expenditure and put it to good use in domestic programs." Events such as the 27 September 1991 speech by President Bush illustrate the changing focus of US security policy.<sup>2</sup> In that speech he outlined sweeping changes to the United States' nuclear defense posture. He drastically reduced tactical nuclear weapons and ordered the stand-down of all bombers and a large portion of the missile force.

Economic pressures and dramatic changes in the global balance of power and geo-political systems have prompted Congress and civil and military leaders to reexamine our national security

strategy. Already, members of Congress and the people they represent are calling for a reallocation of defense dollars. Indeed, the armed forces are going through major restructuring and experiencing large cuts in funding, but now is not the time to sit back and relax.

Increased ethnic tensions and the resurgence of nationalism in various regions, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the civil war in Yugoslavia, the seemingly unworkable Israeli-Arab conflict, the coup in Peru, and continued drug and guerrilla activities in the Andean region are but a few of the present threats to regional stability. Regional instabilities are a threat to our national security interests. Low intensity conflict, the result of that instability, deserves our attention. In a speech to the West Point Association of Washington, the Hon. James R. Locher II (ASD/SOLIC) stated, "it (LIC) is the form of conflict in which U.S. forces are most likely to be engaged in the future."<sup>3</sup>

In a 2 August 1990 speech, President Bush outlined the basics of a new approach to meet the challenges of regional instability and conflict. He called this approach "Peacetime Engagement."<sup>4</sup> Secretary of Defense Cheney in his 21 February 1991 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the President's new strategy "focuses our efforts on regional contingencies and on sustaining the forward military presence in peacetime necessary to deter the outbreak of regional war."<sup>5</sup>

Difficult to define and quantify but still a very real problem, LIC is more than merely a revolutionary war or an act of

terrorism. LIC is an *environment* that involves the struggle of competing principles and ideologies below the level of conventional war.<sup>5</sup> The United States, therefore, must be capable of dealing effectively with a full range of threats that cause instability and uncertainty. Unfavorable outcomes of LIC may gradually isolate the United States, its allies and global trading partners from each other and from the world community.<sup>6</sup>

Conventional forces, however proficient, are often not the right tool in the LIC arena. There are fundamental differences in the use of military power in LIC versus a mid intensity or high intensity conflict. Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) have particular utility in the LIC environment.<sup>7</sup> The way these forces train and their ability to adapt to the broad and complex LIC challenges will have a major impact on the outcome of United States' foreign policy initiatives. To meet the LIC challenges, the Air Force needs to carry out boldly a coherent LIC doctrine that brings together all economic, political and informational instruments of national power. As a point of departure, the Air Force must make use of education programs that develop a solid understanding of LIC concepts and in-depth cultural and historical regional studies. This education is essential to be able to define and support rational and effective regional security analysis and programs.

Notes

1. James R. Locher III, "LIC: Challenge of the 1990's", *Defense '91*, (July/August 1991), 18.
2. Nationally televised address by the President, 27 September 1991.
3. James R. Locher III, "Low intensity Conflicts Require New Strategies", *Defense Issues* (Vol. 6 No 25): 3.
4. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, "Reshaping Our Forces" by George Bush, President of the United States, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990.
5. ASD/SOLIC, Peacetime Engagement Conference Read Ahead Package, Alexandria, Virginia, (10 July 1991), T-1.
6. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1990), 28.
7. Ibid.
8. *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990), 1-1.

## CHAPTER 1

### LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE ENVIRONMENT

Low-intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third-world, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC" (Joint Pub 1-02)

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT. What we now call low-intensity conflict is not a new phenomenon. Limited wars conducted below the level of general war, have been recognized and used extensively. Unconventional tactics and small band warfare have been used by both legitimate groups seeking freedom and human rights and by others pursuing their self-serving interests. Limited wars, or guerrilla (little war) warfare became "popular" during the Spanish Civil War. Later Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and others systematized guerrilla warfare tactics, both military and political, by publishing their thoughts and experiences.

The Air Force addressed limited War in AFM 2-5, Tactical Air Operations: Special Air Warfare, published in 1967. This manual discussed counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and psychological operations, and aspects of country assistance and training. Currently, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts*, discusses LIC operations. Other much needed operational and doctrinal directives such as AFM 2-10, *Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Special Operations*, AFM 2-11, *Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense*, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, are in final draft or test form.

The all encompassing social, economic, political and military aspects of limited wars or LIC, are obscured because of the very narrow view taken of the low-intensity conflict environment. The Filipino uprising under Aguinaldo in 1900, the Nicaraguan revolt in 1920 under Sandino, the 1959 Castro-led Cuban revolution and our own Vietnam experience are examples that conjure up ideas of LIC as insurgent guerrillas in poor tropical countries, seeking to overthrow the government.<sup>1</sup> LIC is much more. Social, economic, political and military factors have always been integral characteristics of LIC. One of these characteristics, probably the most important one, is LIC's overtly political nature.<sup>2</sup> In a conventional war, same as in LIC, the conflict has political objectives. The main difference lies in that in a conventional war, these political objectives are sought and normally achieved primarily through military power. In LIC, the opponents attempt to achieve the political

objectives by a process that incorporates the military, but does not make it the primary tool. The economic and social instruments of national power play major roles in the process with the political instrument being primary.<sup>3</sup>

LIC is a very controversial label. Not only is it broad and complex, but in the eyes of many Lesser Developed Countries (LDC), it represents an arrogant American perspective. What to the U.S. may appear as "low-intensity", to others it may be a fight for cultural integrity and national survival. If the very use of the term is sensitive, how can the United States apply the ideas it embodies? The first step is to gain an understanding of the environment.

STRUCTURE. Militarily we are ready for "action", but though the Air Force has been involved in the LIC arena for years, we are just now beginning to understand and address its unique requirements.<sup>4</sup>

To begin to understand LIC, one can place low intensity conflict as the second tier in a conflict structure, which has for a base Routine Peaceful Competition.<sup>5</sup> The other tiers above LIC are mid intensity conflict (conventional war) and high intensity conflict (nuclear war). Routine Peaceful Competition is not always an ideal environment. Yet, at this level, internal and external disagreements on trade, ethnic differences, political representation, territorial claims, resources, and other issues, can usually be resolved without violence through diplomatic and political dialogues.<sup>6</sup> Above this level violence occurs and we have crossed into the realm of conflict. The tiers

lack rigid well defined boundaries, and LIC is no exception. It overlaps both peaceful competition and mid intensity conflict. During peacetime, LIC overlaps into the routine peaceful competition arena with actions such as security assistance and foreign forces training. It also overlaps into mid intensity conflict with operations like the air raid on Libya on 14 April 1986. This operation had all the aspects of a strictly conventional military operation; yet, its real objective was not military, but political. The President's intent was to send a message to Qadafy to desist in his support of terrorist activities.<sup>7</sup>

LIC ACTIONS. Air Force Special Operations Forces have traditionally concentrated their training, exercises, and operational efforts at the upper end of the LIC tier, that is, the "direct action" aspects of the conflict. Direct actions encompass such tasks as hostage rescue, counter-terrorist activities, preemptive strikes, raids, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and contingency operations. These can be described as limited combat operations in support of United States national interests.<sup>8</sup> Most exercises and training deployments have had as their primary training objective direct combat operations. On the other hand, training and operations in "indirect actions" such as support for insurgents, counterinsurgency training, anti-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and security assistance, have not fared well. Major Richard Newton, in his Special Series CADRE Paper, *Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring the Air Force for Foreign*

*Internal Defense* says, "by optimizing its doctrine, training and equipment for operations at the upper end of the conflict spectrum [structure], the Air Force of the 1990's has all but excluded itself from assisting allies who face insurgents employing guerrilla tactics."<sup>9</sup> The same may be said of Air Force Special Operations Forces training.

This emphasis on the upper end of the conflict structure is the normal consequence of a well defined doctrine, based on conventional and nuclear war, and the primacy of direct military actions in those arenas. Indirect actions meanwhile, have a different emphasis. They require increased military involvement in civilian and political issues. Even more importantly, successful indirect action operations are predicated on close coordination among U.S. and host nation civilian and military agencies.

Ineffective joint, combined, and interagency coordination seems to stem from a lack of well defined policy and doctrine for joint low intensity operations.<sup>10</sup> Ineffective operations also occur because turf battles and differing institutional cultures and perspectives among the various stakeholders severely hinder their ability to work together toward common objectives and national interests. Primarily though, joint, combined and interagency problems cannot be confronted until the military has a clear understanding of its mandate and role in the LIC arena. An underdeveloped doctrine hinders the ability to train and educate our forces for operations in the lower end of the conflict structure.

DOCTRINE. What are the obstacles encountered in formulating a coherent LIC doctrine? First, the United States decision makers have traditionally viewed the world as a bipolar system. Emphasis on Soviet containment, the strategic attack and conventional war in Europe led the Air Force to focus on the conventional and nuclear aspects of the conflict structure. The collapse of the Soviet empire and other recent world events demand a thorough review of this doctrinal approach.

Second, it is very difficult to define what constitutes a threat to U.S. strategic interests. A direct confrontation such as an attack on Western Europe presents clear cut objectives and elicits public support. Meanwhile, the insurgent movements in El Salvador and Peru, appear as remote and unimportant events in the Third World. Since they do not represent a *direct* threat to our national survival, public support will be at best unenthusiastic. A serious lack of understanding of foreign cultures and geo-strategic concepts have led many to dismiss some Third World events as insignificant, with no impact on U.S. strategic interests. In reality, "insignificant" events may be immensely important, since they may affect stability, commerce, and access to strategic minerals and other resources.

Third, there is a misconception that a LIC doctrine and a well defined LIC strategy may mean large scale involvement and commitment of troops in "undesirable" conflicts. This is the "direct action" mentality. Obviously, it is critical that the Air Force be well trained for direct action roles, but its large scale direct action employment in LIC should be only as a last

resort. The American public places very distinct boundaries between peace and war. The national character demands clear objectives and a well defined threat, before it is willing to commit to a course of action.

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the USAF, clearly states; "The fabric of our society and the character of our national values suggest that the decision to employ United States military forces depends on a clear declaration of objectives and the support of the American people."<sup>12</sup> It can be said that "our values, political system, and strategic culture leave us ill-prepared to deal with the ambiguities concerning the causes, objectives, duration and resolution of low-intensity conflict."<sup>13</sup>

I submit that a properly defined and prosecuted LIC strategy, based on well defined regional objectives, will help prevent committing troops for direct actions. Well coordinated civilian and military security assistance programs, aimed at the root causes of discontent and social unrest, help maintain stability and deter lawlessness and budding insurgencies. Potential trouble areas must be identified early and aggressive diplomatic action taken to set up these programs. It is very difficult to initiate indirect action programs while evacuating personnel from an embassy compound. Having a LIC doctrine does not mean that the U.S. will be the "world's policeman" and become engaged in every conflict.<sup>14</sup> Having a LIC doctrine does mean that the United States recognizes it has an important role to play in regional stability.

These obstacles deeply affect the development of a coherent

LIC doctrine. An effective regional LIC plan or concept cannot be generated when the problems, threats and objectives are ambiguous or ill defined. The plan cannot be effective without an understanding of regional issues, and the impact that culture, history, geography and regional politics have on those issues. The education and training that lead to that understanding must be present at all levels. The strategists need this education to develop the plans that effectively confront regional issues. The "crew dog", the maintainers on the ramp, the support specialists must also be trained to have an awareness of the overriding importance of civilian-military coordination and the importance of the political nature of the LIC environment. A thorough education and training program in low intensity conflict is the number one step to well-coordinated and effective operations.

## Notes

1. Lt Col John B. Hunt, USA (Ret), "Emerging Doctrine for LIC", *Military Review* (June 1991): 51.
2. Loren B. Thompson, *Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World*, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 4.
3. Col Barry D. Crane et al., USAF, "Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict", *Special Warfare* (Summer 1989): 7.
4. James R. Locher III, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Challenge of the 1990's", *Defense* (July/August 1991): 17.
5. *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations*, Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 3-0 (Test) (Washington D.C., The Joints Chief of Staff, January 1990), I-6.
6. Hunt, 52.
7. Ibid., 55.
8. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, 1-2.
9. Maj Richard D. Newton, USAF, "Reinventing the Wheel: Restructuring the Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense", CADRE Special Series Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, Al., Air University Press, August 1991), 7.
10. Steven Metz, "Foundation for a Low-Intensity Conflict Strategy", *Comparative Strategy* (Volume 8): 268. Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (October 1990), and Air Force Manual 2-11, *Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense* (September 1991), are in test form and final draft respectively.
11. Newton, 7.
12. Basic Aerospace Doctrine for the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1 (1984): 1-1.
13. Metz, 267.
14. James R. Locher III, "Low intensity Conflicts Require New Strategies", *Defense Issues* (Vol. 6 No 25): 3.

## CHAPTER 2

### LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE AIR FORCE STORY

The unconventional role of the U.S. Air Force in a conflict does not have a specific beginning. Depending on the sources, it is possible to go back as far as March 1916. Then, General John "Blackjack" Pershing used Army Air Corps aircraft in unconventional roles during the strikes against Pancho Villa.

AIR COMMANDOS. In the Second World War, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater presented British commanders with unique challenges. British commander Brigadier Orde C. Wingate used his troops in long range penetration tactics deep behind Japanese lines, but the lack of effective airpower made the initial operations ineffective. In response to Wingate's needs, General H. H. Arnold decided to expand the role of the Air Force into the field of unconventional operations. He determined to find out what airpower could do in unconventional roles supporting ground forces operating behind enemy lines.<sup>1</sup> Led by Lt Col John Alison and Lt Col Philip Cochran, the 5318th Provisional Unit (Air), later known as the 1st Air Commando Group, became proficient at short field landings, air drops, evacuations, and strikes.<sup>2</sup>

EUROPE. In the European theater, the Air Commandos used B-24 and C-47 aircraft to resupply partisan groups and to infiltrate agents deep behind enemy lines. As an example of

their success, during a nine month period from January to September 1944 the Air Commandos flying in OPERATION CARPETBAGGER delivered over 20,000 pounds of supplies, 11,000 packages and 1,000 agents into occupied Europe.<sup>4</sup> In another operation to support the Ploesti raids in Romania, a joint Army Air Corps-CSS project infiltrated agents deep into neighboring Yugoslavia. The object was to organize guerrillas for the evacuation of allied crewmembers shot down during the raid.<sup>5</sup> Over 100 downed airmen were rescued during this operation. Unconventional air operations continued throughout Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean until 1945.

Following World War II, support for the Air Commandos and unconventional airpower decreased rapidly. The wartime experience reinforced the idea that the objective of airpower was to destroy the enemy's will to resist. Since the prevailing theory was that the best way to achieve this objective was through well-executed massive bombing campaigns<sup>6</sup>, the Air Force developed a strategic doctrine based on the bomber offensive. As president Eisenhower's "New Look" policy concentrated on the nuclear capabilities of the Air Force, its unconventional air warfare capabilities became non-existent.

SPECIAL AIR WARFARE CENTER. President Kennedy felt that a policy of massive retaliation restricted the ability of the United States to respond to limited conflicts. He placed new emphasis on the redevelopment of unconventional capabilities to counter communist-inspired revolts. Nikita Kruschev's announcement, on 6 April 1961, that the Soviet Union would

support wars of "National Liberation" added urgency to the creation of a counterinsurgency force.

National Security Action Memorandum 56 tasked the services to develop counterinsurgency forces. As a result, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron was organized at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on 14 April 1961. "Jungle Jim", as the unit became known, had a two-fold mission: training and combat. Soon after activation, in November of 1961, a Jungle Jim detachment deployed to Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam, where it was known as FARMGATE. FARMGATE's objective was to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency operations. *The lack of clear guidance allowed FARMGATE operators to assume an active combat role.* This was to become the pattern of the Air Force in Special Air Warfare.

Further events led to the development of the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, 1962. This new organization absorbed all other unconventional warfare units. The SAWC's primary mission was to train forces of friendly foreign nations, but rapid growth and a heavy operational commitment *hindered the ability of the SAWC to develop coherent unconventional warfare doctrine and tactics.* As the SAWC continued to expand, the escalation of the war in Southeast Asia shifted training efforts away from training the Vietnamese, and toward training U.S. Air Force crews.<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously SAWC's training mission in FARMGATE was rapidly changing to direct action combat operations. In spite of these developments in Southeast Asia, the SAWC saw many successes. One

such success was Detachment 3 at Howard AFE, Canal Zone. Detachment 3 concentrated on a doctrine of "assistance" by training and developing foreign forces to counter insurgencies. Its civic action and training programs, especially its medical teams, garnered much public support.<sup>9</sup>

POST VIETNAM ERA. After the peak years in the late 1960's in which it reached a strength of over 5,000 men and women and 550 aircraft, the U.S. Special Operations Force (SOF), as the SAWC became known, experienced a steady decline. SOF was later deactivated in June 1974.

While U.S. Air Force unconventional capability waned, there was an increased global awareness of the strategic importance of "low intensity conflicts." Active Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts, religious fundamentalism, bombings, kidnappings, and terrorism throughout Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, seemed to continue unchecked. This led to a perception of American weakness and receding international influence.<sup>10</sup>

DESERT ONE. The tragic failure, on 24 April 1980, of the attempt to rescue the American hostages held by the Iranians led the Carter Administration and the Air Force to take a serious look at its ability to conduct operations in the low intensity conflict arena. Investigations in the wake of DESERT ONE found a lack of LIC capability, inadequate force structure and readiness, no organized command and control system and a *lack of doctrinal and strategic guidance*.<sup>11</sup> Beginning in 1981, President Reagan made good his commitment to upgrade the nation's LIC capabilities by calling for budget increases. On 1 March 1983, Air Force SOF

forces consolidated under the newly organized 23d Air Force (MAC), and a Special Operations Panel was created under the House Armed Services Committee.

In spite of the influx of new money, troubles continued to plague the military. The bombing of the Marine Headquarters in Beirut on 23 October 1983, and the Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, on 25 October had decidedly different outcomes, but investigations revealed the same underlying problems with command and control and joint guidance.<sup>12</sup>

TODAY. Events moved rapidly as Congress sought further changes in an attempt to establish a credible force that could meet modern LIC challenges. In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act established a unified (joint) command, which would have jurisdiction over all Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations Units stationed in the United States. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM, raised its flag at McDill Air Force Base, Florida, on 16 April 1987.

The legislation also directed the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC).<sup>13</sup> An additional provision created Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11). This action consolidated SOF funding under a single program to prevent the services from diverting SOF money to non-SOF projects. Soon after, formed out of the 23d Air Force (MAC) assets, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) also gained major command status and became the air arm for USSOCOM.

AFSOC has spent much effort in creating a credible special

operations force. The successes of AFSOC units in JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESEPT STORM proved that the training efforts in direct action operations had paid off. Based on these recent successes we can ask: Has AFSOC developed a credible LIC capability? My answer is: Not totally! The Air Force has made commendable progress in revitalizing its *special operations* capabilities. It has acquired new weapons systems, upgraded its current equipment and improved command, control and communications capabilities. But, it has not placed sufficient emphasis in education and training related to indirect actions tactics and procedures. History repeats itself. As the Air Force experiences a rapid growth in "direct action" LIC capability, a capability that it has shown exceptionally well, the development of both Air Force and joint low intensity conflict doctrine lags. The directives that should provide guidance and direction in the LIC arena are mostly in the "test" or "draft" form. Therefore, the Air Force continues to train, understandably so, in the areas it knows best, and with which it is most comfortable. Education and training in indirect action operations have been relegated to "the back burner". This is the same problem that faced FARMGATE. Lack of guidance and doctrine permitted FARMGATE operations to shift primarily to the training of US aircrews and a direct action combat role. Its assistance and training role became secondary to non-existent.

Notes

1. Lt Col Robert L. Brenci. *USAF Special Operations: The Forgotten Force*. Air War College Research Report, Maxwell AFB, Al. (February 1983): 6.
2. Lt Col Jerry L. Thigpen, USAF. *AFSOC: The Air Force's Newest Command*. Army War College Research Report, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (March 1991): 6.
3. Lt Col David J. Dean. *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict*. (Maxwell AFB, Al.: Air University Press, 1986): 86. Lt Col Thigpen also provides a detailed account of the preparations and employment of the 1st Air Commando Group in the CBI.
4. Dean, 86.
5. Thigpen, 16.
6. Dean, 87.
7. Ibid., 88.
8. Ibid., 98. Lt Col Dean gives a good account of the rapid growth of the Special Air Warfare Center and their inability to develop fully "special" doctrine, tactics and procedures thereby becoming another conventional force.
9. Ibid., 91.
10. Thompson, 9.
11. Thigpen, 39.
12. Thompson, 12.
13. Ibid.

## CHAPTER 3

### REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

I have stated that Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is an extremely broad and complex environment that incorporates all the instruments of national power. LIC is a problematic, yet very real concept that is difficult to define and quantify. Still, most students of the subject probably would agree that the overriding political, economic and social characteristics of LIC make the direct military aspects of LIC subordinate.

An analysis of the role of the Air Force in LIC shows that it focuses most of its efforts toward direct action operations. Air Force journals also follow this pattern. A survey of articles published in the *Air Power Journal* over the last 40 years showed that only five out of fifty-eight articles that dealt with LIC addressed indirect action operations.<sup>1</sup>

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, dated 16 March 1984, discusses a "broad plan for employment" comprised of nine imperatives for the effective use of aerospace forces. These imperatives focus on the direct application of airpower in combat. They do not address the role of airpower in LIC.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, the 1992 version of AFM 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine, Volume II*, does contain solid guidance on the role of airpower in

LIC.<sup>3</sup> But, this is a recently released publication not yet widely read or studied.

Generally, the Air Force is not ready to assume its full role in LIC operations. A lack of understanding and a lack of experience in the broader aspects of LIC could spell failure in a protracted LIC endeavor. There is a need to educate Air force personnel on the basic tenets of LIC and the role of the Air Force in this environment.

Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, defines four broad categories that encompass US military operations in LIC. Support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations.<sup>4</sup> Of these, support for insurgency and counterinsurgency is the most difficult and complex category to understand.<sup>5</sup> I submit that an understanding of this category is the foundation to effective participation in the broader aspects of LIC.

First let's look at the insurgency phenomenon, its governing principles and the government actions required for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Then, let's discuss the role of the Air Force in helping Lesser Developed Countries (LDC) meet insurgency challenges through a well defined Foreign Internal Defense (FID)<sup>6</sup> program.

LIC is a euphemism, coined during the decade following the Vietnam war to replace unacceptable terms dealing with unconventional wars, conflicts and insurgencies. Then, any mention of insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare and

nation assistance conjured ideas of long term involvement in far-away places where we did not belong. These ideas reminded many people of U.S. policy failures and ill-fated adventurism.

As a result, the U.S. military adopted an attitude that ignored the realities of LIC. It did not want to deal with wars that did not fit the traditional conflict paradigm--and Vietnam definitely did not fit the conflict paradigm. This paradigm, began to evolve during the Civil War and matured in the battlefields of World Wars I and II. Generally one can say that it consists of global scale conflict, direct confrontations and survival of the American system.<sup>8</sup> It makes no allowance for protracted, far-away conflicts perceived as insignificant threats to U.S. national security interests. Among other things, the paradigm includes:

"a belief in the value of firepower; a faith in quantification; a tendency to prefer the use of firepower over the direct commitment of soldiers; a belief in the need for an eminent cause for U.S. involvement; a belief that war suspends politics; an emphasis on conventional tactics; a belief that political cognizance undermines combat efficiency; a tendency to concentrate on the 'big war'; a faith in technological solutions; and a belief in the value of offensive operations."<sup>9</sup>

Failure to accept the reality of low intensity unconventional conflicts during the post Vietnam years led to an almost total lack of development of revolutionary war strategies and capabilities. An awareness of the dangers engendered by these attitudes began to emerge when terrorism, regional

instabilities, insurgencies and increased drug trafficking challenged U.S. national interests. These conflicts could not be countered with traditional deterrence policies and conventional strategies. As a result, there was a resurgence in scholarship relating to revolutionary war, guerrilla warfare and insurgency. The military also began to experience a build up in the capabilities of its Special Operations Forces. But, the "Vietnam Syndrome", that aversion to unconventional wars, nation building programs and their negative implications, lingered in the minds of military professionals.

In discussing unconventional conflicts, some terms have been, and remain somewhat unacceptable. Simultaneously, LIC comes under fire for being too broad, and representing only the American perspective. Having noted the effect that terminology has on this sensitive subject, we can say that definition is the first obstacle to understanding.

There are a multitude of terms used to describe events, conflicts and strategies that we now lump under the umbrella of LIC. Thomas Greene calls it the "revolutionary process".<sup>10</sup> Other names include wars of national liberation, internal war, people's war, unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare. The Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) has compiled a list of over fifty terms that describe LIC and its various components.<sup>11</sup>

A cursory look in the library catalog showed several hundred titles that dealt with revolutionary theory, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and related ideas. Authors have used many different terms to categorize, define and discuss this concept.

Still, LIC is much more than a revolutionary war or an internal conflict. But, while they represent only an aspect of LIC, revolutionary wars play a key role in understanding the underlying principles governing this conflict. Dr. Sam Sarkesian states that, "the substantive dimensions of LIC evolve primarily from revolutionary and counterrevolutionary strategy and causes."<sup>12</sup>

Revolution is a term that defies neat and rigid encapsulation. I will not coin a new term. In my discussion, I will simply use "revolutionary movements" when discussing the underpinning principles that form the basic elements of LIC.

In every society there exists a certain level of competition among groups, institutions and individuals seeking changes in their social, economic and political status. I believe that this competition for power, political participation, economic change, social recognition and educational advancement is in itself healthy and adds to the strength and character of a nation.

However, in some instances, this "healthy" competition does not provide a solution to the demands for change. It becomes a source of frustration and conflict among the people as they try to find answers to deep rooted unfulfilled needs and historical grievances. Unfulfilled needs arise when population growth and expectations exceed available resources. This leads to shortages in basic goods and services such as health care and education. Needs also arise when economic rewards are incompatible with the required labor effort and when the ruling elite fails to incorporate the populace in the process of modernization.

Historical grievances include inequitable wealth distribution, land ownership concentrated in the hands of a few elite families, restrictions to political participation and alienation due to ethnic and religious differences.

Revolutionary movements sow their seeds in the midst of these rising frustrations as governments ignore the roots of historical grievances, and are unable or unwilling to meet the needs of the populace. These seeds germinate when established processes do not permit changes that correct the perceived inequalities. Faced with these conditions, revolutionary movements seek to change the existing social and political structure by methods not sanctioned by the ruling government. They seek to alter the prevailing distribution of wealth, status and power.<sup>13</sup> To paraphrase Clausewitz, revolution is the continuation of internal politics by other means.<sup>14</sup>

REVOLUTIONARY CONTINUUM. Revolutionary movements are difficult to categorize. Each is unique in its roots, goals, objectives and process. There is no exact universal revolutionary paradigm with its opposing set of counterrevolutionary strategies. I see revolutionary movements as a continuum. It is homogenous enough to be united by a common set of principles, yet sufficiently diverse to include a multitude of intensities and objectives.<sup>15</sup>

At one end of this continuum, I place movements that do not fit the commonly held ideas about revolution. Some may even say that they are not revolutionary movements at all, but merely "movements for social reform." Scrutiny reveals that they meet

the basic revolutionary criteria--to alter the basic distribution of wealth, status or power through means not sanctioned by the ruling government.

Some of these "revolutionary movements" have been common in the U.S. in the recent past. Examples include: the civil rights movement, the prolife-prochoice abortion confrontations and the social changes in the 60's that included the anti-war movement. Each of these movements had their basis on historical grievances or needs. Each movement, believing that the political system was inadequate or unresponsive to their needs, resorted to sit-ins, demonstrations, disruption of social order and, sometimes, violence to gain recognition, power and a political voice. Note that at this low level of revolutionary action, the movements do not seek the complete replacement of existing social and political structures. They merely seek redress to very specific grievances or needs.

At the other end of the continuum, intense and violent revolutionary actions attempt to restructure completely the existing economic, political and social system. These movements intend to overthrow completely the societal structure, and rebuild it based on their ideas and values. At this end, violence and armed confrontation, primarily along unconventional lines, become important weapons. Examples that fit this end of the continuum include the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru. Loosely placed in-between, there are movements that have sought perhaps a return to more traditional values, and the restoration of the legitimate constitutional mandates that

have been corrupted by a present government.

PRINCIPLES. Three principles ideology, leadership and organization, are common to the basic understanding of the entire revolutionary movement continuum. None can be ignored, as each makes a key contribution. They are the pillars on which revolutionary movements are founded.

Grievances and needs do not spark a revolutionary movement. They only provide the fertile ground on which movements grow. "Revolution begins in the mind."<sup>15</sup> The spark comes from ideas. The realization that change is possible even if the means to achieve those changes lie outside sanctioned processes--a renewed optimism in a better future. This is the birth of an ideology.

An ideology gives revolutionary movement a banner to follow into battle. It provides a sense of legitimacy, unity, *esprit de corps*, a standard of justice and a foundation on which to base the education and training of its followers.

Ideology serves another critical purpose. It simplifies what Greene calls "cross-cutting".<sup>17</sup> Cross-cutting is the need for a revolutionary movement to attract members and supporters from all strata of society. It is what makes the goals and objectives of the movement something that can be appropriated by all the people, not just a small group or class. Concentrating the efforts of a movement on only one group or class has proved ineffective, usually leading to failure.<sup>18</sup>

Effective ideologies normally articulate a broad and coherent set of principles that can be adopted by each member of the movement. A well-developed, coherent ideology allows each

member of the group to identify in it themes that appeal to his personal needs. As an example of a broad "cross-cutting" theme, Fidel Castro focused his call for unity on the hostility many Cubans felt against U.S. economic and political meddling in the island's affairs.<sup>19</sup>

Castro's example also illustrates a primary function of effective revolutionary leadership: the need to recognize and focus the issues that effect cross-cutting alliances.<sup>20</sup>

Leaders do not make revolutions, nor do they manufacture grievances and needs. Revolutionary leaders recognize and use the existing grievances and unfulfilled needs to focus, develop, strengthen and energize a crosscutting program that promises economic and political reform, social progress and a better life. These promises must be perceived to benefit the supporters of the movement at all social levels.

It is not enough that the revolutionary leadership adopt or formulate an ideology. It must articulate and spread the message to the would-be followers and supporters. Leaders are effective communicators. Castro is again a good example. An ardent speaker, he effectively translated ideology and political events into terms that had meaning for the rank-and-file members of the movement. Leaders articulate not only what they are against, but also what they stand for--their faith and their dreams. With rhetoric wrapped in lofty terms and appeals, the leader gains converts.<sup>21</sup> He convinces his followers that long term sacrifice is not a duty but a privilege.<sup>22</sup>

Leaders also have strength of character and personality.

This is particularly important in the early stages of a movement, when a weak organization and a diffuse ideology make it vulnerable to a government's counterinsurgency measures and setbacks. Sometimes it is on the strength of the leader's personality, bringing together splintered factions and fringe groups, that a revolutionary movement maintains its idealism and vitality and forges ahead.

To convert ideology and words into action, leaders must depend on an organization. An organization is the means by which the revolutionary movement constructs parallel socio-political institutions and establishes a shadow government. It enables the movement to conduct education, training, recruiting, fund raising, communications, propaganda and intelligence activities.

This shadow government challenges the legitimacy of the government with its own programs. It attempts to win the loyalty of the people by proving that the movement is effective where the government has failed. It wants to show the people that the revolutionary programs are the answer to their problems and conflicts. A strong organization also helps reduce factional rifts, establishes a clear chain of command and provides for "succession" if there is the loss of a leader.<sup>23</sup> Within the organization, members can find mutual commitment, group loyalty and homogeneity of opinion.<sup>24</sup>

The armed element of the organization provides for the control and safeguard of the bases and sanctuaries. It supplies the manpower for sabotage, terrorism, kidnapping and guerrilla warfare and other armed tactics. In time, the armed element

forms the cadre that prosecutes the more conventional armed confrontations usually found in mature movements.

Five factors influence emerging revolutionary movements and provide leaders with the opportunity to establish credibility and legitimacy.<sup>25</sup> The first factor is increased mass frustration. This develops when the gap between rising expectations and the government's ability to meet those expectations widens rapidly. Second, an increase in the number and activism of disenfranchised elite dissidents seeking greater political voice--the radicalization of the new elite. The third factor is a unifying motivation. This involves widespread support for a movement across the total spectrum of society due to a rise in nationalism. This unity may be generated in response to a perceived external threat that affects national, ethnic or religious values and the inability of the present government to respond effectively.

A sudden or severe economic or political crisis also influences the revolutionary movement. Major economic reverses, inability to compete in the commercial world market and political incompetence can be easily translated to government ineptitude.

A permissive world view is the last factor that affects a young movement. This is the perception that world powers and neighboring countries are indifferent to, or unable to derail the revolutionary movement. Astute revolutionary leaders take advantage of these factors to show that the government is ineffective and powerless to change conditions that foster grievances and internal conflicts.

Notes

1. Survey conducted by the author at the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Al., January 1992.
2. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States*, 16 March 1984, 7.
3. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, Vol II*, March 1992, 51.
4. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, 1990, 1-6. AFP 3-20 has a detailed explanation of each LIC category.
5. Maj Philip S. Yang, USA, "Psychological Strategies for Low Intensity Conflict," (Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, Va., undated), 1.
6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, December 1989, 150.
7. Lewis B. Ware, *Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World*, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Al., 1988), 164.
8. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Low Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles and Policy Guidelines," *Air University Review*, January-February 1985, 15.
9. Col Howard L. Dixon, USAF, "Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions and Policy Concerns," (Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, Va., June 1989), 10.
10. Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements*, (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 15.
11. Dixon, 20. Among the unique names associated with LIC, Col Dixon mentions subterranean war, concealed aggression, attenuated conflict, armed peace, constrained operations and war against lesser adversaries.
12. Sarkesian, 5.
13. Greene, 15.
14. David V. J. Bell, *Resistance and Revolution*, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1973), 10.
15. Major J. A. Robbs, Royal Australian Infantry Corps, "Low Intensity Conflict: A War by Any Other Name," Marine Corps Command and Staff College Student Research Project, 1988, 52. The difficulty of categorizing and labeling movements can be immediately noted in this report. Major Robbs names eight different types of revolutionary movements. Secessionist, Democratic, Revolutionary, Restorational, Reactionary, Conservative, Reformist and Anarchistic.

16. Sarkesian, 3.
17. Greene, 99.
18. Ibid., 100.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 69.
21. Ibid.
22. J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Insurgency: The Threat to This Generation--Waiting for the Fat Lady to Sing," (International Analysis Center Inc., New York, undated), 4.
23. Greene, 119.
24. Ibid., 120.
25. James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1991), 10.

## CHAPTER 4

### COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND THE U.S. ROLE

Counterrevolutionary actions, by their very nature, are difficult to plan and implement. Counterrevolutionary actions by a government are usually reactive. This means, that the revolutionary, who has his definitions of justice and fair play, selects the time, place and method of attack. His tactics and ideas may not be constrained by preconceived conventions.

Against these unconventional tactics and methods traditional responses are usually ineffective. Large scale sweeps, individual acts of retaliation, repressive measures and severe police actions without regard to judicial and constitutional processes tend to alienate the population and treat only the symptoms not the disease.

Effective counterrevolutionary tactics could be discussed in terms of the Clausewitzian trinity.<sup>1</sup> Clausewitz states that the government, the people and the commander and his army make up the three fundamental elements of war. These elements are closely interrelated, and each plays an important role in counterrevolutionary strategy.

A government challenged by a revolutionary movement must understand that this movement did not start in a vacuum--there

are reasons for the opposition. Like an alcoholic, the government must first recognize that there is a problem, and then do something about it.

An effective and responsive government is the best and most preventive counterrevolutionary measure.<sup>1</sup> Governments challenged by a revolutionary movement must initiate reforms that address the grievances and conflicts of the nation. These actions have two purposes. First, they are the government's primary tool to regain or bolster its legitimacy, its moral right to govern with the consent of the people.<sup>2</sup> The second purpose, is to discredit and eliminate the shadow revolutionary government and its leadership.

In the early stages of a revolutionary struggle, the balance of power is normally on the side of the government. It controls the political institutions, the communications infrastructure and an organized military force. It is in the government's vital interest to keep these advantages. Yet, whatever action it takes, the government must do so in a way that respects the aspirations, values and beliefs of the people. It must follow legitimate constitutional processes.

Previously, I mentioned five factors that help to establish and provide credibility and legitimacy to a revolutionary movement. Now, once established, the revolutionary movement must capitalize on one or more of the following social and political conditions:<sup>3</sup>

\*corruption and discrimination

\*inertia and over reaction

\*maladministration and incompetence

\*unstable political system

\*foreign manipulation and exploitation

These are the conditions that the government must address to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. All actions, to include military efforts, must be aimed at supporting reform programs that effect a fundamental changes. The center of gravity in a revolutionary struggle is the same for both the government and the revolutionaries. The center of gravity is the heart of the socio-political system--the people.

Governments must earn the trust of the people through political, economic and social actions that redress their grievances and fulfills their needs. Like revolutionary movements, the government must have credible and articulate leadership. It must employ an organization that responds to political, social and economic needs in a secure environment. Finally it must articulate an effective "cross-cutting" ideology. In essence, to have an effective counterrevolutionary strategy, the government must create its own revolution.<sup>5</sup>

Military strength alone does not decide the outcome of a revolutionary struggle. The key is the support of the people. Still, this does not mean that the army has a minor role in this type of conflict. An organized military organization is essential as the third part of the trinity. Effective reforms cannot be carried out in an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty. A well trained and professional military provides security to enable the people to carry on with their lives.

Properly trained security forces promote an environment in which the political, economic and social institutions can conduct their day to day affairs in safety. The military and other security forces may be the only organizations that can provide communications, food distribution and medical support to endangered areas. They are the link between the people in isolated areas and the government that has promised to help them. These are also the forces that take the fight to the enemy by denying their sanctuaries, cutting lines of communications and dismantling the revolutionary intelligence network.

When the government uses military force in these operations, the troops are instruments of power employed to meet political objectives. The government soldier needs to be educated and trained to know that the fight is more than just going against a group of "rebels". They are fighting against a force that threatens their national survival. They are fighting not only to defeat an enemy, but to rebuild their nation. Their actions, good and bad, will have a lasting effect on the populace.

Except in exceptional or desperate circumstances to protect life and property, the government must consider the possibly negative consequences of large scale applications of force. It cannot allow indiscriminate use of force and power in the name of counterrevolutionary actions. Excessive or misapplied military force, abuses and lawlessness by government forces heighten anti-government feelings and sustain revolutionary strategies.

On the other hand, prudent use of force, fair judicial processes, reforms and humanitarian assistance efforts are a

threat to the revolutionary movement.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD) STRATEGY. The governmental "revolution" of ideas and reforms previously mentioned is known as the IDAD Strategy. The IDAD strategy is "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social and military) that respond to the needs of society.<sup>6</sup> The IDAD is ideally preventive in nature, but in the face of an active revolutionary movement it is a useful counterrevolutionary strategy.<sup>7</sup>

The IDAD strategy implements the government reforms, people programs and security operations through four interdependent functions:<sup>8</sup>

\*Balanced Development

\*Neutralization

\*Security

\*Mobilization

Balanced development pursues national goals through integrated political, social and economic programs. Security includes all measures to protect the populace, and to provide a safe environment for development. Neutralization separates the insurgent from the population by denying mobility, surprise and sanctuaries. Mobilization includes all activities that provide manpower and materiel support to the government and the administrative infrastructure.

AIRPOWER. Airpower makes use of speed, range and flexibility to support humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) operations, tactical intelligence, communications support,

logistic airlift and, when needed, close air support and interdiction. Airpower effectively applied in the functions mentioned above also may serve as a deterrent to would be revolutionary movements.

Each of these airpower roles provide unique opportunities to enhance an effective IDAD strategy. For example, airlift significantly increases the government's ability to reach outlying areas that lack a communications infrastructure. This capability to "reach out and touch" isolated areas can be an effective tool to:

- \*Move troops rapidly to trouble spots.
- \*Provide basic health and educational services.
- \*Deliver construction equipment and supplies.
- \*Expand information and policy programs.
- \*Assist in disaster relief and medical evacuations.

Viewed from another perspective, there is no room in the IDAD strategy for indiscriminate use of air power. Close air support and interdiction operations must be carefully planned and prosecuted with discretion. Collateral damage in a LIC environment carries a high price in political and psychological repercussions.<sup>9</sup>

U.S. INVOLVEMENT. The 1988 National Security Strategy of the United States says, "Consistent with our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict, when it is in US interest to do so, the United States will . . ."<sup>10</sup> The document then proceeds to enumerate actions that may be taken in a LIC situation. The point is, that the U.S. does not necessarily need

to take part in every country's IDAD strategy. Selectivity is a key issue in LIC involvement.

Selectivity means that we know what we are getting involved in and that there is a reason for it. What is this conflict all about? What are the roles and objectives for the U.S.? Are U.S. national security interests affected by this conflict? Not every conflict threatens national security interests.<sup>11</sup> We must be smart enough to ask these questions and seek the best possible answers before we get involved.

If we need not get involved in every conflict, where do we draw the line? Participation in any foreign assistance endeavor, and the level of that participation, should be a rational and soundly based political decision. It must be founded on accurate regional strategic assessments, guided by U.S. strategic policies and objectives and developed within a framework that includes, among one of its most important aspects, long term commitment.

Clausewitz, was right on the mark when he said, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature."<sup>12</sup>

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID). Normally, any U.S. involvement in a host nation IDAD strategy should be through the FID<sup>13</sup> program. This is the U.S. program designed to complement the host nation IDAD. It assumes that the host government is taking responsibility for the political, economic, informational

and military actions and reforms required to defeat the threat.

FID programs have six objectives:<sup>14</sup>

\*Enhancing US influence in the host national and region.

\*Stabilizing the region.

\*Maintaining US access.

\*Improving overall international cooperation.

\*Reducing the need for increased US assistance to the host nation and region.

\*Improving military-to-military relationships and interoperability of forces and enhancing the host nation's war fighting capability

Foreign Internal Defense is a joint, combined and interagency program integrating civilian and military resources. These resources and efforts must be coordinated through the Country Team to ensure employment appropriate to local conditions and IDAD objectives.

The US military will always play a supporting role in FID operations.<sup>15</sup> FID requests for military assistance must be thoroughly evaluated by survey teams that include intelligence, counterintelligence, special forces, psychological operations and civil affairs personnel. US military employed in a FID role should do so in units tailored to meet specific conditions and levels of assistance as directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA).<sup>16</sup>

U.S. low intensity conflict policy recognizes that the most effective application of military power in a LIC environment is indirect through security assistance--advising, training and

assisting host nation forces.<sup>17</sup> Special Operations Forces (SOF) have particular utility in this environment. A major task for SOF in low intensity conflict is participation in FID programs.<sup>18</sup>

The 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act assigned overall responsibility for FID activities to the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Responsibility for carrying out the ground, air and maritime elements fell to the respective service components.<sup>19</sup>

U.S. Air Force FID programs develop, enhance and sustain host nation aerospace capabilities through methods and resources that support the total IDAD strategy. Specific Air Force FID objectives are:<sup>20</sup>

- \*Train foreign military forces to employ and maintain aerospace systems and support facilities.
- \*Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on the correct use of aerospace power.
- \*Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the security assistance program to aviation units of eligible foreign governments engaged in internal defense and development (IDAD) operations.
- \*Provide direct support to host countries by furnishing humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), tactical intelligence, communications support, logistic airlift and combat firepower for tactical operations.

These objectives can be achieved through the effective application of the previously discussed airpower characteristics

of speed, range and flexibility. In a FID program airpower can be employed in three general operational categories:<sup>22</sup>

- \*Indirect support
- \*Direct support not involving combat
- \*Combat operations

Indirect support is normally in the form of logistic and training assistance, through the security assistance organization,<sup>23</sup> supplemented by joint-combined exercises and exchange programs. Direct support not involving combat usually involves intelligence collection and analysis, communications support, logistic support, civil military operations (CMO), aerial photography and mapping, strategic airlift and counterdrug operations.<sup>23</sup> None of these actions are designed to commit U.S. forces to combat. Finally, combat operations support joint-combined efforts at the higher levels of assistance.

As discussed, USSOCOM is responsible for military FID activities. The same mandate gives the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) the responsibility to develop and carry out the airpower FID programs. Yet, the Air Force does not have a coordinated program that effectively provides airpower expertise to other nations, and AFSOC lacks the capability to implement a FID program. AFSOC personnel have not been involved in sustained, coordinated and integrated efforts to train, advise and assist foreign counterparts. Thus, "there is very little experience in transferring the principles, procedures and techniques of aviation support for internal support and internal development."<sup>24</sup>

The Air Force has experience with Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and deliveries of defense articles to other nations. Many countries have benefitted from effective operational and logistics programs that support F-15, F-16, C-130, F-5 and other aircraft. But these programs supported the perceived needs of the host nations to deter and counter external threats. This does not agree with the basic premise of FID, which is to assist host nations to counter and defeat internal subversion and insurgency.<sup>25</sup>

Normally, Air Force FID efforts have been limited to disaster relief, humanitarian assistance activities, exercises and other short term operations.

There is plenty of evidence to support the existence of a FID organization. AFSOC has published a proposal that contains an exhaustive reference section quoting FID related legislation, studies, memorandums and doctrine.<sup>26</sup> The problem we face is not whether AFSOC should establish a FID organization, but what form should that organization take?

In "Reinventing the Wheel, Structuring the Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense," Major Richard Newton proposes the creation of a Foreign Internal Defense Wing. This wing would be composed of three squadrons responsible for flying training, technical training and combat development. This last squadron would have the responsibility for developing and evaluating tactics and procedures applicable to the FID environment.<sup>27</sup>

AFSOC proposes an organization divided along mission lines. These missions, as identified by AFSOC, are: reconnaissance and

surveillance (R&S), tactical airlift, close air support and interdiction (CAS/interdiction) and psychological operations (PSYOPS).<sup>28</sup>

While both proposals have much merit, I believe they will fall short of establishing an organization that fully supports FID. Major Newton's proposal concentrates heavily on the training branches. These are extremely important, but they concentrate primarily on the Air Force unique roles. Major Newton does not propose how to integrate these training efforts into the interagency process.

The AFSOC proposal along missions lines also falls short. This organization seems to favor the more direct roles of FID. Like the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) of Vietnam days, there is the danger that, given the American view of war and combat, American personnel may tend to take over the direct prosecution of the mission to the detriment of host country training.

Since FID is part of the broader issue of security assistance, it must incorporate a branch that coordinates and integrates airpower applications with the other agencies that are involved. AFSOC needs to take the lead and develop a FID coordinating center with the mandate to integrate FID airpower requirements with other Air Force organizations besides Army, Navy and civilian agencies.

I agree and support Major Moulton in saying that the "lifeblood" of a FID organization is a strategic concepts branch.<sup>29</sup> This branch, assigned at the AFSOC level, would be responsible monitoring legislation, strategic issues

actions by other services and government agencies and new FID and LIC initiatives. In addition, the strategic concepts branch would monitor new and ongoing Air Force FID programs to evaluate requirements versus objectives and compliance with policy and directives. This branch would be the integrating and coordinating element of airpower FID efforts.

Formal education for all FID personnel is essential. FID programs should include instruction in revolutionary warfare, IDAD, LIC, cross-cultural studies, counterdrugs and counterterrorism. Ironically, the branch that needs to fill this void in the FID organization is already in place. The USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, has an excellent curriculum on special operations, revolutionary warfare, area studies and LIC concepts. In addition USAFSOS could monitor language and area orientation training.

What I propose then, is to expand on Major Newton's construct to include strategic concepts and formal education branches. I believe these two areas are the key to effective training programs.

There are many obstacles to an effective FID organization. The AFSOC focus on direct action efforts and equipment excludes basic FID concepts. The traditional view of "find them and shoot them", and the basic doctrinal beliefs, specifically Air-Land battle doctrine, are not appropriate to FID efforts. Finally, FID proponents must contend with the attitude in many Air Force camps that, "FID is none of our business."

There are other obstacles. I have not discussed specific

weapons systems or manpower levels. These discussions have to be based on budget considerations and USSOCOM and AFSOC commitment to a FID mission. Manning a FID organization will be difficult. Who would like to work for an organization where there are few tangible rewards? Possible low promotion rates, lack of recognition, and limited career paths will be major deterrents to forming a highly competent force. Any FID organization should be selectively manned by uniquely qualified and motivated volunteers that deserve special career handling and opportunities.

Final thought, whatever the final form, a FID organization must incorporate strategic concepts, education and training to provide effective and viable assistance to host nations pursuing an IDAD strategy.

Notes

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
2. Sam C. Sarkesian, *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction*, (Precedent Publishing Inc., 1975), 13.
3. Ibid., 12.
4. Robbs, 46.
5. Sarkesian, "Concepts," 10.
6. Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts*, Test Pub, October 1990, GL5.
7. Air Force publications refer to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. For the purpose of this work I will treat revolutions and insurgencies as synonyms.
8. AFF 3-20, 2-8.
9. John R. Moulton, "Role of Air Force Special Operations In Foreign Internal Defense," CADRE Paper (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB. Al., September 1991), 9.
10. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington DC: The White House, 1988), 34.
11. Lt Col David J. Dean, *The Air Force Role in Low Intensity Conflict* ( Air University Press, Maxwell AFB Al., 1986), 7. National security interests, or "vital interests" as they are usually called, are hard to define. One could say, that they represent those interests over which we are ready to fight.
12. Clausewitz, 88.
13. Joint Pub 1-02, 150.
14. Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Test Pub, October 1990, 2-8.
15. Joint Pub 3-07.1, *JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense*, Initial Draft, April 1991, II.
16. Joint Pub 3-07, 2-8.
17. *National Security Strategy*, 1988, 35.
18. Joint Pub 3-05, 1-9.
19. Major Richard D. Newton, *Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring the Air Force for Foreign Internal Defense*, CADRE paper, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Al., August 1991), 2.
20. Air Force Manual (AFM) 2-11, *Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Foreign Internal Defense*, Revised Final Draft, (September 1991), 3.
21. AFM 2-11, 27
22. Ibid., 28. For further discussion on the Country Team refer to Lt Col Steven E. Cady, *The Country Team*, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB. Al., May 1991)

23. AFM 2-11, 31. This manual has a detailed description of these operations.

24. Colonel August G. Jannarone and Ray E. Stratton, "Building a Practical United States Air Force Capability for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), *The DISAM Journal*, Summer 1991 85.

25. Ibid., 83.

26. AFSOC, *Foreign Internal Defense*, July 1991, 25.

27. Newton, 17

28. AFSOC, 11.

29. Moulton, 16.

CONCLUSION.

Our current defense posture reflects our inability to understand the form and substance of this direct challenge to our interests. Our lack of understanding is manifested in a lack of unity of effort, lack of doctrine, training, organizations and materiel to execute operations; and lack of a sustaining support system. Short of war, we have no strategy or comprehensive plan to address the challenges of political violence.

Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project

Final Report, Executive Summary

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Low-intensity conflict is an extremely complex and broad concept which embodies all the instruments of national power. The overriding political, economic and social characteristics of LIC make the military aspects of a conflict subordinate. In the Air Force, LIC is misunderstood and often, it is confused with special operations. In LIC, direct action operations make up the more traditional tasks associated with special operations. Rescues, raids, pre-emptive strikes, and NEO have been the primary objectives of training. Conversely, indirect actions such as counterinsurgency support, humanitarian assistance, security assistance and support for insurgents have received less attention.

The difficulty in LIC education and training is the lack of joint and Air Force doctrine, and an explicit national strategy that encourages and simplifies coordinating efforts between civilian and military agencies. The causes of an underdeveloped doctrine are three-fold. First, since World War II the Air Force has focused its energies on a strategy of containment and strategic bombardment. Second, current world events make the threats to U.S. interests hard to define. This is further complicated by poor understanding of regional culture and geopolitical factors. Third, there is a perception that having a LIC doctrine will place the U.S. at the forefront of every terrorist act and insurgency in the world. The American public demands clear objectives and defined threats before it is willing to support active participation in a conflict.

From a historical perspective, the Air Force has accepted unconventional roles. Still, lack of doctrine has hindered operations throughout the full range of the LIC spectrum. The result has been a reliance on the direct action operations to the detriment of indirect actions that could be potentially more beneficial.

The current efforts to improve Air Force LIC capabilities are commendable. Several directives, new and revised, are in final draft form. Also, there is an increased academic effort by several Air Force officers, and AFSOC is pursuing a definition of its role in the Foreign Internal Defense environment. Meanwhile, the answer is to continue education efforts at all levels, and to continue seeking an understanding of this difficult environment.

Simply stated, there is a lot more to LIC than having long-range penetration, airdrop, night-vision goggle airland, and direct fire support capabilities. Indirect actions are a key to effective LIC deterrence before the U.S. has to commit forces in direct support.

Training and education are the foundation of this capability. Currently, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) offers the most comprehensive LIC education program available. It is a three-week, nearly fifty-five hour, program that covers all aspects of LIC in depth. Yet, only some officers, about 300 per year, benefit from this course. We need other efforts to expand the programs. The USAF Special Operations School, at Hurlburt Field, Florida, currently offers an excellent curriculum in revolutionary warfare, cultural communications and other aspects of insurgency and terrorism. This school is the ideal vehicle to carry out an expanded LIC education and training program.

Understanding the insurgency phenomenon is essential as a stepping stone to the broader aspects of LIC. Revolutionary movements have their inception when "healthy" competition among individuals, groups and institutions in society give way to frustration over unresolved and deep rooted needs and grievances. This frustration grows when the government is unwilling or unable to meet the needs of its populace and redress their grievances. The movement gains strength with the idea that change is possible, and that there is a chance for a better future. Yet, to make these changes happen it must act outside the sanctioned

government processes.

The success of a revolutionary movement depends on the ability of its leadership to recognize and focus the people's grievances and needs. It must articulate an ideology that can be appropriated by persons at all levels of society as a perceived solution to their problem and conflicts. Finally, there has to be a strong organization, whose role is to form a shadow government that challenges the legitimacy of the government through parallel institutions and reform programs.

The U.S. Air Force has a role in LIC, not only in the direct actions that are its current emphasis, but more critically, in indirect actions. Air Force involvement in a host nation's IDAD strategy through a well researched and planned FID program may prevent the deployment and employment of U.S. combat troops in protracted, unpopular conflicts. A well supported FID organization with emphasis on education, joint and interagency coordination and strategic concepts is necessary to maintain a credible Air Force forward presence and power projection.